- Your history
Lorenzo's Roadmap for EMU (and politics in general)
In a speech delivered for the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Isle of Poros, 08/07/11), ECB member Bini Smaghi makes some very interesting comments on decision-making in times of crisis. This 7 pager is straightforward, not revolutionary but carrying simple truths and some good advice for politicians. Unfortunately Brussels overlooked it. Especially his analysis on political unions, the current accountability problems in a democratic framework and the enforcement of rules need a closer look. Some teasers out of his lecture of late Friday, very much underscoring the present problems and its roots :
"Recent experience has shown that tough decisions are often taken only on the brink of the abyss, when the fateful consequences of not taking such decisions become all too evident to governments and to those they govern. This creates at least five highly undesirable outcomes, in particular within the European context :
First, it increases uncertainty in financial markets about the course that will ultimately be followed...Second, the longer a decision is delayed, the more unpalatable it ultimately becomes, as the action required to calm the markets and to restore stability has to be even stronger...Third, by putting off difficult decisions until the very last moment, interim or partial solutions tend to be adopted, instead of more lasting ones. Crises then drag out as one quick fix gives way to another without the underlying weakness being addressed..Fourth, as the sequence of quick fixes proves to be ineffective in getting to the root of the problem, reform fatigue starts to spread and people become less willing to accept increasingly unpalatable measures. The result is a blurring of the difference between the negative but short-term impact of the necessary adjustment on the one hand and the disaster which would result from inaction on the other. This in turn increases the risk of taking the wrong – irrational – decision...Fifth, if people do not realize how close they are to the abyss, and thus do not support the adoption of the unpalatable decisions, policy-makers have to make them aware of the risks by appealing directly to them, which may in turn frighten and unsettle the markets".
Bini Smaghi moves a little bit further and makes comparisons with the US and the current market handling of double standards
"The current debate about the debt ceiling in the US, with some politicians openly speculating about a technical default, is a clear example of democratic decision- makers avoiding tough decisions until they are pressured to make them. Similarly, Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008 showed that waiting for too long on the brink of the abyss does not necessarily lead to the right decision. It showed, too, that the costs of a disaster are much higher than those arising from unpalatable decisions taken at an early stage. What makes the difference between the euro area and other cases is that failure to take prompt action in the latter is considered to be a policy mistake, even if it has dire consequences, but it does not call into question the whole institutional and political set-up. When Lehman Brothers collapsed and the US Congress initially voted down the TARP in September 2008, the dollar was not considered to be at risk. In Europe though, a crisis is sometimes considered by outside observers as putting the euro, and the Union itself, at risk of disintegration. Academics and other experts deliberate on whether the euro area is viable and how it can be rescued. Closet eurosceptics suddenly reappear, dusting off their I-told- you-so commentaries. And politicians feel compelled to restate their faith in and commitment to the euro and the Union. The issue is all the more surprising given that, overall, the euro area is progressively recovering from the 2008–09 recession, with some countries performing strongly. The average budget and deficit in the euro area is substantially lower than in other parts of the world."
And the paper offers more insights on how the political union currently operates, what is practically feasible in the short term to improve it and what still needs to be done. And Bini Smaghi concludes :
Winston Churchill said: “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else”. The last 18 months suggest that Europeans, too, may do the right thing, after trying everything else. However, in today’s world, with sophisticated financial markets, deferring decisions creates uncertainty, entails substantial costs and may undermine the political cohesion of the Union. This is particularly the case when, as J.K. Galbraith observed: “Politics consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable”. To see disaster looming before choosing the unpalatable is a dangerous strategy... Europe’s undertaking has no precedent. It demands original thinking, as much as, if not more than, that of America’s founding fathers in their times. It certainly also demands their courage and leadership.
The 7 page speech can be found at
http://www.bis.org/review/r110712c.pdf
27 Comments
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ducdorleans
On 12 Jul, 2011
Bini Smaghi begint zijn speech met "I would like to speak about a very topical theme: the capacity of democracies to take difficult and pressing decisions in critical times."
En gelijk zit het fout! Waarom is er iemand nodig die "difficult and pressing decisions" moet maken? Er is iemand nodig omdat Bini Smaghi daar zijn dagelijks brood mee verdiend. Omdat hij de indruk wil geven dat er aantal mensen moeten zijn (en hij is er een van) die DAT als dagtaak hebben. Die "het" kunnen. Die "het" weten. Die weten waar en hoe. Naamkaartje is "Lorenzo Bini Smaghi - taker of difficult and pressing decisions".
Heeft er al iemand een handleiding gezien over het taken van moeilijke en dringende beslissingen? Iemand die weet - weet hé, niet denkt dat ie het weet - wat de reactie van miljoenen mensen zal zijn als er dit of dat gebeurt ? In hun straat, in hun dorp, in hun land? Op hun werk! In elk geval denkt Bini Smaghi het wel te weten, want hij geeft zijn 5 uitkomsten bij 5 "taken decisions".
Griekenland en Italië, en alle die volgen, zitten in de problemen omdat collega's van Bini Smaghi in het verleden difficult and pressing decisions hebben genomen. Zij zitten in de puree omdat bepaalde collega's bv. hebben gedacht dat zij beter wisten wat, een aantal jaar geleden, de prijs van geld moest zijn.
Icarus ? Genesis 41 ? Onzichtbare hand? Natuurlijk kent Bini Smaghi zijn klassiekers. Maar, ernaar handelen zou afdoen aan zijn status. En dus niet!-
christof Govaerts
On 13 Jul, 2011
Beste,
U hebt een punt, een handleiding over goed management is niet te vinden, ook niet in de betere boekhandel. Mijn observatie is dat deze commentaar komt van iemand die toch de laatste maanden opmerkelijke interviews heeft gegeven en ondanks zijn Italiaanse stempel getuigt van marktkennis en politieke inertie. En jammer genoeg moet hij wijken voor Draghi op aanvraag van de fransen. Ik zie hier trouwens gelijkenissen met België : Italië zal versneld moeten handelen of het IMF komt langs nadat de rente de 7% gepasseerd is en dan valt het prijskaartje een pak hoger. Wij moeten oppassen : nu oedige beslissingen nemen of later onze nek op het blok en een pakketje geserveerd krijgen waarbij de huidige 20 mia een lachertje is.-
ducdorleans
On 13 Jul, 2011
Christophe,
kan zijn, ik ken de man en zijn uitspraken daarvoor te weinig ... maar ik heb nu wel een kwartiertje aan het zoeken geweest op Google, waarin Mr. Bini Smaghi (voor bv. 2008) ons waarschuwt voor de Grieken ... (en terzijde onzen Didier wist dat bv. wel allemaal, maar hij heeft dat ook vergeten te zeggen ... )
wat ik bv. wel heb gevonden is ...
19 Jun 2006 - A default by Greece on its debt is not an option, says Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, executive board member of the European Central Bank. He tells FT Frankfurt ...
en dat terwijl Mr. Bini Smaghi ook in dat speech zegt " ... if Greece, and the Eurogroup, had not waited until May 2010 to address the crisis but had done so several months earlier, the fiscal adjustment would probably have been milder, etc, etc ..."
Misschien kan Bini Smaghi ons richting het artikel sturen waar hij enige maanden voor May 2010 ons op de hoogte heeft gebracht van het komende onheil ...-
christof Govaerts
On 13 Jul, 2011
Nobody is perfect en Bini Smaghi kan natuurlijk nu gratuit kritiek spuien aangezien hij moet vertrekken ; maar zijn vertrek en de manier waarop dit weer achter de schermen geregeld is spreekt wederom boekdelen. En liever Bini dan Draghi want met deze laatste heeft Goldman zo wat overal zijn marionetten zitten binnen centrale banking : leve frontrunning !
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Theo
On 13 Jul, 2011
I see your point on Lorenzo and I agree with you. Why do the French really want him out? Is it really only just because they want to have a French there? Or is there a conflict between him and the road the other Italian wants to travel once he gets in the big chair?
The ECB is starting to look like the US Supreme Court.
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incognito
On 12 Jul, 2011
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/771411-italy-last-battleground
That, Citigroup analysts stress, doesn’t mean that the Italian banks are selling their BTPs. But they are buying less of them, leaving to unenthusiastic foreign investors the task of bridging the gap created when the Treasury bonds are offered. Speculation was launched over the anticipated drop in demand and was combined with an attack in the Stock Market on the banks themselves.
And now? After yesterday’s collapse, the yield of ten-year BTPs jumped from 4.62% to 5.68% in only five weeks. In the world of finance, there is a kind of 7% rule, which states that in the cases of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, when the yield rose beyond 7%, the next step was a bailout, explains Gary Jenkins of Evolution Securities. But the closer yields rise to this threshold, the faster things go.
On average, the three countries stayed above 5.5% for 43 trading days before moving to 6%. They stayed at a level over 6% for 24 days before moving to 6.5% and in 15 days had moved beyond 7%.-
incognito
On 12 Jul, 2011
43+24+15= 82 trading days = about three months = mid October, hmm:)
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Theo
On 13 Jul, 2011
The best plans are always simple!
The euro was one such plan... based on the Maastricht treaty.
Politicians apparently thought that signing it was the hardest part. And so they played political games to get into a monetary union... without really understanding what it was. All Socialist party apparatchiks across Europe (at the time) saw was the advantages relatively cheaper interest rates would give them in buying votes at home.
With each loan they took, they made a game with very simple rules more and more complicated.
The problem is, they don't know how to deal with complexity.
Complexity is managed with facing reality and doing what needs to be done. Not with sitting around for 9 hours pretending to be doing something, while organising market technical glitches.
Complexity on the scale we have today is also not dealt with by politicians trying to reach a consensus through Hegelian dialectics.
Complexity has only one solution - go back to the original plan!-
christof Govaerts
On 13 Jul, 2011
Indeed, genius is in silmplicity ; and when everthing fails, read the original manual and don't write a new one.
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Jan P
On 13 Jul, 2011
Het is duidelijk dat we op punt 5 zijn aangekomen; Er moeten stevige stappen genomen worden omdat we bij de afgrond staan, en het moet 'verkocht geraken')om de nodige maatregelen te laten slikken.
Dat geeft op zijn beurt weer meer onrust op de markten met hogere gevraagde rentes op staatsobligaties. Keihard handelen is dus de laatste vermelde mogelijkheid.
Stap 6 is inderdaad niet vermeld: einde de jaren dertig was dat een oorlog, het kan ook gewoon een (straat)revolutie zijn, of een stevig financieel truukje (shorten verbieden, hedging verbieden, geld bijdrukken, of ook inflatie kunstmatig opdrijven).
In elk geval zal de impact stevig zijn; en zoals ook in het verleden het geval was zal het eerder de rijkere of de hogere middenklasse zijn die de rekening betaald. Integendeel wat velen willen doen geloven...
vooral rijkdom wordt aangetast door;
Inflatie
geld bijdrukken
extra belasting
oorlog
revolutie
...
Misschien is het allemaal gewoon een correctie van het verschil tussen rijk en arm?-
Theo
On 13 Jul, 2011
All revolutions, uprisings and such (including those in North Africa and Middle East) have been organised by highly educated and organised relatively young people from the upper middle class. The catalyst has also always been taxes
Nothing new under the sun.
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incognito
On 15 Jul, 2011
pff, 't is hier maar een dooie boel hoor:)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/8638644/Return-of-the-Gold-Standard-as-world-order-unravels.html-
Theo
On 16 Jul, 2011
@ incognito
When you have a currency which used to be gold-based and is now devalued by 98% in as many years... and you have gold which rises in nominal terms only as and relative to the value of that currency melting away... what exactly determines the value of gold? Fiat money!
If money is worthless... and gold is, according to some, money... then gold is just as worthless - let's not forget that it can be, and it has been, devalued just as easily-
incognito
On 16 Jul, 2011
true: in our fiat system, the value of gold is a 'derivative' of fiat money, whereas in a gold standard system, the value of paper money was a 'derivative' of gold; gold coins can be devalued (clipped), but in the 19/20th century gold standard system, devaluation or artificial inflation of gold wasn't possible
I believe that the USD/Gold standard worked well, the closing of the gold window in the early 1970s is imo the most fundamental cause of our current troubles (which have, imo, only started), it ignited or made possible an enormous, 4 decades long inflationary credit boom, now we're faced with the inevitable bust, Die Untergang des Abendsland (as economic powerhouse of the world).
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/8640460/Stock-markets-batten-down-the-hatches-against-a-bear-market.html-
Theo
On 16 Jul, 2011
@ incognito
I think so too.
On the other hand, if the gold standard worked so well, why did Belgium refuse to play by its rules?
Aren't we back to the same central issue - the terms of any monetary system... If members don't follow them as stipulated, any system will become problematic, and lead to a systemic failure due to the risk created in the system.-
incognito
On 17 Jul, 2011
the gold standard didn't work anymore during the interbellum, the UK went off the gold standard of which it was the centre in 1931, other countries, including belgium, followed,
the proximate reason is the same as the reason why the US ended the gold/usd standard in 1971: foreigners asked en masse gold for their pounds, because of a burgeoning budget deficit, the government took action (higher taxes, reduced government spending, higher interest rates, from 2.5 to 6 percent), but to no avail, au contraire: the budget deficit increased
the pound plunged, central banks rushed out of currencies and into gold, leading to a huge increase of the discount rate in the US (from
1.5 to 3.5 percent)-
incognito
On 17 Jul, 2011
so why did the gold standard not work anymore? that was due to the depression, and the depression was due to ... the (first) collapse of the gold standard in 1914 (Duncan, the dollar crisis), this collapse was followed by the same kind of inflationary credit boom that we have seen since the end of the dollar-gold standard in 1971: "[It] set off the same chain of events. Huge trade imbalances fueled the surge in credit creation responsible for the 'Roaring Twenties' ... and the Great Depression that inevitably followed." (p. 54)
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Theo
On 18 Jul, 2011
@incognito
Amased that most Belgians don't even know their own financial history... but getting used to that.
Anyways: Theories are nice and all... but the hard reality of it is that both a gold standard and a fiat currency system come to exactly the same end in the event of war - both those that wage them and those that suffer them.
All changes from one system to another always happen after a period of war... and come to an end again after a period of another war.
Gold standards always come to an end with war as countries cannot handle the hyperinflation... which when you think about it, is no different from increased inflation in a fiat currency system as we see it today.
Hence why EU politicians have this need for peace and stability at all cost and a pressing urge for more and more political union.
This of course leads to the end of the monetary union... as Greece today plays the same role as Belgium played in ending another monetary union back in 1926.
In 1999 the ECB signed the Washington agreement to protect the value of gold as a reserve. One of the clauses is not to lease out gold reserves for speculative purposes. And yet, we have all recently learned that Belgium has leased 41% of its gold reserves for unknown purposes. -
Bart
On 18 Jul, 2011
And??? Not a single word about 1909 when French and Germans made bank notes legal tender and thus corrupting the bill market... and so effectively eroding and ultimately destroying the gold standard five years on? And on and on the same story. The rest is history inflated indeed.
Now the NBB always knows exactly what it's doing for fun and profit, so hush hush ;-)
Anyway, let's hope they listen to mr.Smaghi's words and if not, gold is a bridge over troubled waters. Currencies are not, they mostly are the troubled waters ;-)-
Theo
On 18 Jul, 2011
I didn't know Germany was part of the Latin Monetary Union...
But yes, Germany did profit from the stupidity of the members every time they debased their coinage, and most notably Belgium, which thought that given its geographic position, it formed the perfect place for dealing with surrounding non-member countries.
Let's not forget that Belgium was also using French gold for all its dealings. Thus France did make all the decisions when it eventually had to get Belgium out of trouble.
Wait a minute... that sounds very familiar!
There was something recently about France bailing out the Belgian financial system...
But yeah, hush hush... we don't want the "vultures" to come and bite us in our behinds while we have our heads firmly stuck in the sand.
Do we really thing people are that stupid and don't know what's going on? Who are we kidding!? ;)-
Bart
On 18 Jul, 2011
ummph, placed a little wrong, meant 1909 as a precursor to 1914 collapse gold-standard in Incognito's post. Read, meddling with... by gov's... brought about disaster. Think we can at least in general agree on that ;-)
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incognito
On 18 Jul, 2011
about the latin monetary union
http://courses.cit.cornell.edu/wbb1/papers/Bae%20Bailey%20LMU-2003.0707.pdf
A primary driving factor in the failure of the LMU was the performance of Italy’s
government. Budget deficits and government borrowing were not kept under control while
issuance of subsidiary silver coin and small denomination paper money imposed costs on other Union members. Similar problems arose under the pre Euro arrangements in Europe when the fiscal deficits and money growth of weaker members were “exported” to Germany and other stronger economies through the managed exchange rate system that prevailed at the time. Is this likely to happen again? Euro-area countries have no power to create additional money and, furthermore, they must adhere to constraints on budget deficits and other macro indicators. Thus, the powers that Italy used to undermine the LMU to her own benefit are not available to Euro-area countries. However, the conditions under which a member state might be “warned” or penalized for violating fiscal deficit strictures remain an issue and it is conceivable that a member in trouble may put itself at risk of leaving or being ejected from the euro area. -
incognito
On 18 Jul, 2011
I don't know to what extent the coercive legal tender laws of 1909 (installed by france and germany in preparation for the war, they wanted more gold reserves, so they stopped paying civil servants in gold) played a role in the demise of the gold standard in 1914, but the main factor was the war itself: european nations had to borrow more money than they could under the gold standard, so the gold standard (convertibility in gold) gave way to a monetary standard, based on government credit; after the war, a new standard was installed (gold standard act, 1925), but it was flawed (and contributed to the credit boom):
"The Gold Standard Act of 1925 did not completely restore the old arrangements. Bank notes remained legal tender but were no longer convertible into gold coin at the Bank."
see also point 6. Falsifying the Gold Standard through Banknotes
being Legal Tender.
http://www.walterzander.info/acrobat/Montary%20Chaos.pdf
In fact, the system that has been in general use since the beginning
of the World War, including the so-called gold standard or
nominal gold currencies, may be described as paper
currency.-
Bart
On 18 Jul, 2011
@Incognito,
the point of point 6 you reference to above is what I meant about 1909. Once it's legalised to mess, you get a mess in the end. thx for refs. (must keep it short, bad connection)
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incognito
On 18 Jul, 2011
the history of money and gold/silver standard(s) is extremely complex, but the heart of the matter is simple: without constraints, imposed by a hard money standard, politicians (certainly if they are democratically elected) mess things up, always, we're now paying the price (with absolutely no end in sight) for the last fiat experiment (1971-?)
hence Shaw's advice (1928): "You have to choose between trusting to the natural stability of gold and the honesty and intelligence of members of the government. And, with due respect for these gentlemen, I advise you, as long as the capitalist system lasts, to vote for gold."
however, the most striking feature of the history of gold "is that gold led most of the protagonists of the drama into the ditch." (bernstein), beware of (collective) gold fever...
if gold makes it to the front page of the economist, the wall street journal or time magazine, it will have become a very dangerous investment
we shouldn't need gold as an anchor of our financial system, but history shows that we do need it (or something similar), because we're not fallen angels but evolved apes:) -
Theo
On 18 Jul, 2011
thanks for link. Interesting read
It doesn't matter what happened in 1909, because the LMU was dead already by the time of the International Monetary Conference in 1867.
The LMU was an official subset of an unofficial "franc area". This is similar to the use of the US dollar or the euro in many countries today. Eventually 18 countries adopted the Gold franc as their legal tender (or peg). 4 of them ( France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland) agreed on a gold to silver conversion rate and minted gold and silver coins which were legal tender in all of them. They voluntarily limited their money supply by adopting a rule which forbade them to print more than 6 franc coins per capita.
Europe was gradually switching at the time to the gold standard. But the members of the Latin Monetary Union paid no attention to its emergence. They printed ever increasing quantities of gold and silver coins, which constituted legal tender across the Union. Smaller denomination (token) silver coins, minted in limited quantity, were legal tender only in the issuing country (because they had a lower silver content than the Union coins). . -
Theo
On 18 Jul, 2011
...
Not Italy, but rather the Vatican played a very dirty role by exploiting the weaknesses of the LMU and caused a lot of damage to it also long before 1909
The LMU was unable to control world prices of gold and silver. When silver became overvalued, it was exported/smuggled within the Union, in violation of its rules. The Union had to suspend silver convertibility and thus accept a humiliating de facto gold standard of Germany and UK. Silver coins and tokens remained legal tender though. The unprecedented financing needs of the Union members - a result of WWI - delivered the coup de grace. The LMU was officially dismantled in 1926 - but expired long before that
















