Just in case...
this module (html) has no parser
There once was was an English castaway, stuck on a desert island in the Pacific. When by accident a ship discovered the unfortunate man after 20 years, they found him running around naked, only wearing a bowler hat. When asked why he was running around naked, the answer was : "Why not, hardly any one comes around here". So why the bowler hat then ? "That's just in case some one should drop by".
In a world of financial uncertainty, an ace up the sleeve always comes in handy. To illustrate the growing uncertainty and the current difficulty of asset allocation in portfolios, this is what Marc Faber - another famous Dr Doom - had to say about it last week : "For the time being, I buy gold. I don't know what else to buy". And Marc Faber is not the only one "in the dark". Besides growing interest of small retail players (through ETFs, physical coins..), it seems that the big players such as central banks world-wide have become increasingly active on the gold market, for the first time in nearly two decades becoming net-buyers. A cynic might conclude that this is the ultimate contrarian indicator and that it is high time to sell (at previous occasions, when central banks were heavily involved in the gold market through selling, it was the start of a bull market). Well, this time it might be different, certainly in view of some other big shifts going on and the potential which is still there.
First of all, China has changed the rules of the game after it gave in this weekend to major pressure coming out of the US. The pressure was put out of two angles. Angle no 1 involves the well known argument of accusing China to keep its exchange rate artificially low and hereby causing a huge US trade deficit. Looking at the numbers however, it seems to be a an exclusive US problem because the Chinese trade balance with the G-20 ex US shows a small deficit. Nevertheless, by announcing a certain willingness to let the Yuan appreciate, China has created some deflection from the G-20 summit in Toronto next weekend. Deflection to the extent that we should not expect major exchange rate moves in the Yuan/USD rate. The second angle of US pressure comes from the decreasing interest of China in US debt. China holds some 900 bio USD in US Treasuries which is about 30% of its total forex reserves. It had been steadily decreasing its position until the Obama administration came along two months ago. And China was not the only net seller over the past 6 months, also Russia substantially decreased its holdings in US Treasuries. The following graph gives the monthly evolution in bio USD of holdings in US Treasuries since November 2009 :
Active gold buyers over the last year were India (bought 200 tons from IMF, raising its total to 615 tons) and Russia which has systematically, month after month, been adding gold to its central bank reserves. Russia has also increased its mining efforts last year by increasing production (new mines) by almost 20%. For China the same applies and one can expect that a lot of this new production will directly end up in the vaults of Bejing and Moscow. And these are not the only central banks adding gold as a form of diversification. This week it has been reported that Saudi Arabia has more than doubled its reserves, from the previously announced 143 tonnes to the current 323 tonnes.
Now if we look at the composition of the reserves of the most powerful central banks in the world, the picture becomes as follows :
Some argue that decreasing yields on bonds and higher gold prices can go hand in hand : if it seems deflation is not the outcome , than gold will be the hedge for the "long" bond position. So central banks buy up government debt and gold to be risk (inflation) neutral ? Could be, but then some big players still have a long way to go. Look at China and Russia for example : Their gold position, though fairly big, is far from sufficient to hedge against a US or global inflation surprise. And not surprisingly, BRIC countries are the ones to monitor closely : China holds 30% of its reserve exposure in UST, Russia 20%. India seems quite all right (8,7% UST) but Brazil is on the other extreme : 73% of its reserves (164 bio USD) is invested in UST bills/bonds while its gold reserve amounts a meager 1,12 bio USD or 0,5% of its total; So with the exception of India, BRIC central banks have still some way to go, call it diversification, call it inflation hedge or hedge against $ weakness under the motto "just in case".
The fact that BRIC and OPEC (Saudi Arabia) have been at the centre of this small story is no surprise either. These countries are steadily changing the power relationships in global economics and/or have a lot to win or to loose. If the USD for example looses some of its unique international reserve status, hoarding gold might basically be an excellent instrument in anticipation. On the the status of reserve currency, it is not only the USD coming under fire but also the Euro. Last week, several statements of central bank officials pointed in that direction. Bot Christian Noyer (ECB) and Alexei Ulyukaiev (Russian CB) stated that Australian and Canadian $ become increasingly attractive for central bank diversification purposes. UBS, the world's no2 forex trader, recently issued a report in which it predicts that the IMF will add the Canadian and Australian $ to a basket of currencies it uses in transactions. Liquidity of these markets for the time being prohibits these currencies and debt assets to become a biggger part of CB portfolios.
As for China and the latest developments on the Yuan, the US cannot have it both ways by imposing currency pressure ("please accept a weaker $") and debt pressure ("please continue to buy our debt in $"). The natural outcome of this game might be that yields on US Treasury bonds should go higher because of the risk premium (monetization, weak currency outlook) and the fact that China will have less reserves at its disposition to buy US debt. This is just a consequence of demand (down) and supply (up), requiring lower prices and hence higher yields.
To finally put it in a broader context, the present "gold bug" might just be a reflection of what happens when "real" economics is overtaken by "illusionary" economics, the latter translated in over-stimulus through debt creation and money printing. So at some stage, the stresses of debt-money overwhelm the system. In a transitory stage, the only solution for debt-based money systems is the printing of more money to counteract deflation fears. And then inevitably money metals such as gold and silver come to the rise, merely reflecting the loss of value of paper and electronic fiat money. So is the current fiat system ruined and is a form of metal standard re-emerging ? May be it is still too soon to make this call but in the mean time, it doesn't hurt either to wear a bowler hat, just in case.
2 Comments
-
Jeroen
On 9 Aug, 2010
Knap artikel, Christof. Jammer dat er zo weinig reacties op jouw posts komen. Misschien blijven lezers te vaak hangen op de homepage, bij Geert's posts? Blijven doorgaan aub!
Persoonlijk vind ik de aan de gang zijnde paradigmashift hoogst fascinerend en tegelijk beangstigend.
Misschien toch een anker doorheen alle spin: "He who has the gold makes the rules" ? Vanuit dat zinnetje bekeken kan men misschien gemakkelijker 'begrijpend lezen' wanneer over het IMS en reform voorstellen gepubliceerd wordt?
De laatste dagen trachtte ik me doorheen drie papers te worstelen:
* “Reserve Accumulation and International Monetary Stability” (IMF, dd. 13/04/2010, te vinden via http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/041310.pdf )
“uiteraard” met als voorkeur daarin een grotere rol voor SDR’s of zelfs overgang naar een nieuwe multipolaire ‘supra-nationale’ reserve-currency, de –jawel Kenyes- ‘bancor’.
* “Beyond the Dollar. Rethinking the International Monetary System” (Chatham House Report edited by Paola Subacchi and John Driffill, dd 03/2010, te vinden via: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16146_r0310_ims.pdf )
komt neer op de suggestie van “ a multicurrency reserve system for a multipolar world economy”, met grotere rol voor internationale supervisie, in het bijzonder grotere rol voor IMF etc.
* “Is Our Monetary Structure a Systemic Cause for Financial Instability? Evidence and Remedies from Nature” (Lietaer et al., dd 04/2010, te vinden via http://www.lietaer.com/images/Journal_Future_Studies_final.pdf )
De paper stelt het monopolie van bank-debt-money aan de kaart. Goeie commentaar hierop te lezen: http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/08/04/306346/imf-blueprint-for-a-global-currency-yes-really/#comment-1060239
“The robustness or resilience of a network is determined by looking at two variables, efficiency and diversity. Our culture's obsession with efficiency alone is steadily increasing the chance of collapse, not decreasing it.”
&
“Diversity is the ticket, not yet more efficiency. Power ought to be distributed, not concentrated still further, and money's role in 'controlling' society needs to be demoted to as low a pulse as possible.”
“Geld”, dat uiteindelijk toch een essentieel onderdeel van een humane samenleving is en m.i. een sterk ethisch en sociaal aspect heeft, wordt conceptueel door bitter weinig ‘gewone’ mensen interessant gevonden. We leven, denken en handelen binnen een kader, een paradigma, dat voor ons gecreëerd wordt door … wie?
De macht om “geld”, in al zijn functies, (currency, unit of account & store of value) te ‘definiëren’, is te belangrijk om enkel overgelaten te worden aan een machtige elite. Jammer genoeg komt dit binnen de standaardeducatie weinig of niet aan bod. Probleem is ook dat commentaar hierop vaak in de conspiracy-hoek geduwd wordt.
Op een Hegeliaanse manier wordt in de mainstream kennelijk de weg naar meer van hetzelfde voorbereid. Ik kan niet anders dan interpreteren dat de ‘publieke’ versie van de SDR, ofte bv. een soort ‘bancor’ of supra-nationale fiat currency, gebaseerd op andere fiat currencies, niets meer of minder is dan ‘fiat’ van ‘fiat’, binnen hetzelfde bank-debt-monopolie-kader, dat daarenboven wettelijk is opgelegd door overheden. Ik vind dat geen comfortabele gedachte.
Lietaer begint in z’n paper met een metafoor:
“You are given a car without brakes and with an unreliable steering wheel. And you are sent across the Alps or the Rockies. When you crash, you are told that you are a bad driver; or that your road maps are out of date. And everybody is endeavouring to get that same car back on the road, with as little change as possible…predictably until the next crash. Indeed, such a car is not fit for driving; it has structural problems which, if not fixed, will predictably cause other crashes. Extending the metaphor, and assuming that only structural solutions can genuinely address structural problems, a helpful starting point would be to identify the nature of the structural problem that is plaguing our financial and monetary system.”
In zijn conclusie i.v.m. het IMS lezen we dan ook:
“This is not a management problem, it’s a structural problem. So the good news is that the repeated financial and monetary crises are avoidable. However, that will happen if, and only if, we are willing to revisit the structure of our money system. Specifically, different types of currencies issued by different types of institutions would provide the diversity and the higher interconnectivity that a resilient financial system would require.
En uiteraard, zeer belangrijk, vervolgt hij: “The most valuable role for government in implementing our proposed approach could limit itself to specifying the kind of currency other than conventional bank-debt national money it would accept in payment of fees and taxes.
De hele zaak komt dus neer op ‘wie mag definiëren wat geld is?’, ‘welke barrières staan in de weg van meer diversiteit’ (en dus competitie) etc.
Zo lang de definitie van geld ingezet wordt als wapen in het strijdtoneel op de internationale scène van een struggle for power, kunnen we wellicht weinig anders dan ‘boom-bust’ cycles ondergaan en – ultiem – wellicht mega-clashes zo nu en dan.
Jammer genoeg ben ik als goed geïnformeerde optimist dus eerder pessimistisch en zie ik daar niet meteen verandering in komen.
Wat je dan wel kan doen – en ik denk dat Christof daarnaar verwijst – is stilletjes het schouwspel vanop veilige afstand volgen en geheel volgens het principe “he who has the gold makes the rules’” zelf je eigen centrale bank spelen.
Doet me denken aan een ander stukje dat ik enige jaren terug las, te vinden via: http://www.galmarley.com/framesets/fs_monetary_history_faqs.htm
Meerbepaald de paragraaf “Gold at the junction of monetary systems”.
“A previously successful credit based system will eventually collapse under the weight of its historical circumstances and the excesses of credit which it is sucked into at the time of its greatest success. As the process of collapse unfolds one monetary store after another demolishes savers. If they hold notional long term obligations like pensions the underwriters fail. If they hold institutional debt the issuers fail. If they hold bank notes and the banks fail. It takes very few failures before the population starts to see risk in every credit based construct. Their faith in their institutions evaporates, and they become acutely aware of the dangers of anything intangible, and anything whose supply can relatively easily be expanded. This is when they begin to think obsessively about things whose supply is subject to some fundamental limit.
It becomes possible to understand why gold re-materialises as the only good money in times of such great economic distress. During such a period the most valued asset is the one which is incorruptible, and because the scarcity of gold is almost uniquely beyond the power of men to change (and because it can be discreetly owned) it is gold which re-appears as the agent of wealth storage and transfer at the junctions between the much longer episodes of representative money.
At these relatively rare junction points, as the wheel of optimal monetary solutions turns through its phases, ownership of gold is what empowers a bold and contrarian few to take control of large amounts of capital. Even as gold comes back into vogue, so the seeds of the new representative fiat currency system which will subsequently replace it will start to germinate, for the simple reason that there is never enough gold to finance the opportunities for growth in a potentially successful economic state.
When the economic conditions are right for productive work and useful business development gold is an inferior form of money. Given two neighbouring currency systems, one gold based and one fiat, and with a decent variety of opportunities with underlying demand, the fiat system will comfortably outperform the gold system. Braver businessmen will back 2, 3 or 4 ventures at once, rather than the single project which gold allows, and they will usually win the race to the top of the economic pile.
So at least half the art is to appreciate that there is no permanent answer, and that ultimate success depends on being flexible enough to profit from a return to a token based monetary system.”
Daarmee is niet gezegd dat we terug moeten naar een goudstandaard. Wel dat op bepaalde punten en bij paradigmashifts bleek dat de ‘stor of value’ functie van goud voor (grote en kleine) vermogens telkens zeer goed (en beter dan dat) gewerkt heeft. -
christof Govaerts
On 13 Aug, 2010
Thanks for the support, we will try keep up the good work























